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Abstract: This paper investigates the causal impact of non-state armed groups on local 
institutions during the armed conflict in Colombia, and tests competing theoretical 
mechanisms that may shape such effect. Our identification strategy is based on the 
construction of contiguous-pairs of rural communities that share common socio-economic 
characteristics but differ in armed group presence. The results show that the presence of 
armed groups is associated with increases in overall participation in local organizations, with 
a particularly strong effect on political organizations. This strengthening of local institutions 
during wartime appears to be driven by coercion exercised by armed groups that capture local 
organizations for strategic war purposes, rather than a reflection of a vibrant civil society. 
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The analysis of the onset, duration and termination of civil wars has to date taken place 
without much consideration for the institutional settings that underpin the decisions of state 
actors, rebels and civilians during wartime. However, throughout human history, armed 
violence has been used strategically by political actors to transform or appropriate the 
institutions that shape the allocation of power (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Cramer 2006; 
Justino 2013; Kalyvas 2006; North, Wallis and Weingast 2009). These forms of institutional 
change are likely to have profound implications for the survival and security of civilians, and 
for post-conflict recovery. Yet the relationship between civil wars and institutional change is 
largely under-researched, largely because armed conflict is generally theorized as a departure 
from political order, rather than intrinsic to the creation and change of institutions (Kalyvas, 
Shapiro and Masoud 2008). As a result, a large literature has focused on studying civil wars 
as symptoms of ‘state collapse’ (Milliken 2003; Zartman 1995) or ‘state failure’ (Ghani and 
Lockhart 2008), without much acknowledgement for the fact that the ‘collapse’ of state 
institutions is not always associated with the collapse of social and political order (Kalyvas, 
Shapiro and Masoud 2008; Justino 2013). In reality, different political actors attempt to 
occupy the space left by weak or absent state institutions, by building new institutions that 
advance their war objectives, or capturing and controlling existing institutions. Control over 
the civilian population by non-state armed groups is often exercised through violent means, 
but not at all times, nor everywhere (Arjona 2010; Kalyvas, Shapiro and Masoud 2008; 
Mampilly 2011). This is in particular the case of insurgencies where rebel groups, unable to 
directly confront larger and better-equipped state forces through military means, must resort 
to co-opting and organizing civilians in order to gain the necessary strength to effectively 
contest the state or control key territories (Kalyvas 2006; Lichbach 1995; Weinstein 2007).  
We take advantage of a unique dataset on the armed conflict in Colombia to analyze 
how armed groups affect local institutions during wartime. Specifically, we analyze the 
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causal effect of armed group presence on individual participation in local collective 
organizations across 222 communities in Colombia, and test empirically competing 
theoretical mechanisms that may plausibly shape the relationship between non-state armed 
groups and institutional change during wartime. We focus on local collective organizations 
because these are key institutions in areas where public goods provision is limited. In these 
settings, local collective action may solve coordination problems (Ostrom 1990), and provide 
networks of support (Foster and Rosenzweig 2001; Fafchamps and Lund 2003). Local 
collective organizations are also important institutions that can be mobilized for political and 
economic purposes during and after armed conflicts (Riley 2005).  
Institutional change during wartime takes place when different actors contest and 
sometimes win the control of territories and populations, transforming social, economic and 
political structures, organizations and norms. Institutional change results from the interaction 
between non-state armed groups and local populations. On the one hand, armed actors may 
form alliances with local organizations or particular groups of the population in order to 
advance their strategic objectives. Alliance formation may be voluntary when communities 
share the ideological views of armed groups, or coercive as armed groups appropriate local 
institutions for their own purposes, or replace community leaders with their own supporters 
(Acemoglu, Reed and Robinson 2014; Kaplan 2010). On the other hand, local institutions 
may be used and transformed by civilians themselves to oppose and resist armed groups 
(Arjona 2010; Petersen 2001). We make use of important regional differences in terms of 
presence of armed groups in Colombia to evaluate the causal institutional impact of armed 
group presence and arbitrate between these competing mechanisms.  
The empirical analysis is based on data provided in the Encuesta Longitudinal 
Colombiana de la Universidad de los Andes (ELCA), a unique dataset with specific modules 
designed to understand how institutions and social norms emerge and evolve during conflict. 
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Our main identification strategy relies on comparing contiguous pairs of rural communities 
that share common socio-economic characteristics but differ in terms of armed group 
presence. This strategy allows us to control for unobservable variables, such as other local 
institutions, cultural traits and other characteristics that vary smoothly across communities 
and may be potential sources of bias. This is an important contribution of the paper because it 
enables us to control for potential endogeneity in the relationship between armed conflict and 
local institutions. In many contexts of armed conflict, violence is not random as specific 
individuals and localities may be targeted as part of the strategic objectives of armed groups 
(Kalyvas 2006), or due to geographic characteristics that facilitate their movements (Fearon 
and Laitin 2003). The non-random nature of violence and armed group presence may result in 
an omitted variable problem as unobservable variables may determine jointly exposure to 
conflict and the organization of local institutions. Results may also be affected by reverse 
causality when armed groups choose to take over communities with weak institutions because 
capture is easier, or choose to target communities with strong institutions for deliberate 
destruction (if they resist their presence and objectives) or to establish control (if they are 
sympathetic to their cause and may help advancing their political goals once the war is over). 
We are able to address these endogeneity concerns by taking advantage of within-community 
pair variation in armed group presence across Colombia.  
We find that the presence of armed groups in any given community is positively 
associated with an increase in overall individual participation in local organizations. This 
effect is driven by an increase in individual attendance of meetings of political organizations, 
and is accompanied by reduced individual participation in political decision-making 
processes. We explore whether increased participation in local collective organizations may 
be the result of communities organizing themselves to resist non-state armed groups, or 
driven by the capture of local institutions by armed groups. This theoretical distinction is 
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important because each mechanism will have different implications for the dynamics of 
conflict locally, as well as for post-conflict recovery. Institutional change that results from 
resistance may sow the seeds for stronger organizational capacity among affected 
communities. The capture of institutions by armed groups may in contrast lead to lower 
social cohesion. Our results support the latter mechanism. The results suggest that locals are 
deliberately excluded from political organizations when armed groups arrive in the 
community, indicating that armed groups may capture local institutions by imposing new 
leaders and bringing in new community members that support their political objectives. The 
results are stronger in communities where armed groups stay longer as this allows them the 
time to consolidate their institutional control. 
These results provide an important contribution to how we understand the emergence 
of order and governance in conflict areas, by providing detailed evidence on strategies 
employed by non-state armed groups beyond the use of violence, including interventions in 
the design and operation of key local institutions in areas they attempt to control. This is an 
interesting result because it suggests that institutional change is endogenous to conflict 
processes. This observation may provide important micro-foundations to understand the 
duration and re-ignition of armed conflicts given the impact that local institutions will have 
on the strength and level of authority exercised by non-state groups, on the level of support 
armed groups can expect from local populations, and on the ability of the state to operate and 
intervene in areas they control.   
The paper adds also interesting insights to recent work on the effect of war 
victimization on social capital. A number of studies have shown that individual exposure to 
violence during armed conflict may be associated with increases in pro-social behavior and 
engagement in collective action once conflicts are over (Bellows and Miguel 2009; Blattman 
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2009; Gilligan et al. 2014; Voors et al. 2012).5 Although other studies have shown more 
nuanced effects of conflict on pro-social behavior (Bauer et al. 2011; Cassar et al. 2011, 
Nunn and Wantchekon 2011; Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti 2011), these results have led 
several authors to suggest that conflict may be associated with positive social transformation 
in the long-term, by providing “new evidence against pessimistic views on the destructive 
legacies of civil war” (Voors et al. 2012: 962). The mechanisms that may explain these 
results have remained untested. The results in this paper indicate that institutional change 
may be a plausible mechanism, but suggest caution about the prevalent positive 
interpretation. This is because we may observe an increase in what appears to be pro-social 
behavior when institutions are captured by armed groups. This is unlikely to result in 
inclusive development or democratic outcomes in the aftermath of conflict.  
 Another limitation of this body of work and other recent studies on the micro-level 
effects of armed conflict has been their focus on violence as a proxy for conflict exposure. 
This may be problematic because it may leave out general equilibrium effects of conflict 
caused by the presence of non-state actors and the institutional changes they impose – as 
shown in this paper. Since direct exposure to violence is low when non-state armed actors are 
hegemonic (Kalyvas 2006), the coefficient on direct exposure is unlikely to capture fully how 
armed conflict influences local institutions. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes how 
local institutional change has evolved in Colombia as a result of exposure to armed conflict. 
We then discuss the theoretical relationship between armed groups and local institutional 
change and identify a set of competing hypotheses that may explain the effects of armed 
group presence on local collective organizations. After this discussion, we present the 
empirical strategy, and discuss our main econometric results and their robustness to 
                                               
5 Bateson (2012) shows that crime is also associated with increases in pro-social behaviour and in social 
engagement. 
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alternative model specifications.  
 
Armed conflict and local institutional change in Colombia 
 
Colombia has been characterized by profound forms of institutional transformation as a result 
of decades of armed conflict. Two major internal conflicts have affected Colombia since 
1940. The first conflict erupted during the first half of the 20th century as a result of a struggle 
between the two main political parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives. This period, 
known as La Violencia, ended in 1958 with a power sharing agreement between the two 
parties which excluded leftist movements. Peasant organizations that emerged during the late 
period of La Violencia turned into left-wing guerrilla groups during the early-sixties (Sánchez 
and Meertens 1983). The emergence of the illegal drug trade intensified the conflict by 
providing resources to left-wing guerrilla groups, and promoting the creation of private 
armies for the protection of drug barons, and some large land-owners, from guerrilla attacks 
(Sánchez and Palau 2006; Gutierrez and Barón 2005). The conflict moved then from isolated 
areas to areas with abundance of natural resources and economic dynamism, and aggressions 
against the civil population escalated sharply. The paramilitary demobilization in 2003, along 
with an increase in public efforts to improve the provision of national security, has resulted in 
a decrease in the levels of violence. However, violence continues to persist in isolated areas 
of the country. 
Violence against the civil population was intense in both conflicts. The period of La 
Violencia resulted in more than 200,000 deaths in rural areas (Palacio 1995, Sanchez and 
Meertens 1983). Between 1985 and 2013, approximately 166,000 people died due to the 
conflict, 4,700,000 people were forcibly displaced, 27,000 people were kidnapped and 25,000 
people were abducted (Grupo de Memoria Histórica 2013).  
8 
 
The presence of different armed groups and their strategic objectives influenced 
strongly social relations and local institutions due to their imposition of social norms and 
economic regulations. Guerrilla and paramilitary groups regulated daily matters, controlled 
movements of the population, and assumed the roles of the state in the regions under their 
control (Arjona 2010; Gutierrez and Barón 2005; Grupo de Memoria Histórica 2011a). These 
groups enforced economic regulations by defining rules of extraction for natural resources, 
acting as intermediaries between the communities and private enterprises, and levying taxes 
(Grupo de Memoria Histórica 2010, 2011a).  
Other strategic objectives of armed groups included the capture of state institutions, the 
weakening of the political system and the elimination of existing power structures to impose 
a new social order. Non-state armed actors co-opted or joined local authorities to control the 
population and capture local rents (Arjona 2010). The decentralization process that started in 
1988 facilitated a closer relation between local authorities and armed groups, setting the 
ground for armed groups to control local institutions and gain greater access to political 
power and local budgets (Sánchez and Palau 2006). Armed actors also sought to directly 
influence elections (Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos 2012). The purpose was to undermine 
state presence, weaken the legitimacy of the electoral process and allow them to increase 
control over the civilian population (Grupo de Memoria Histórica 2010).  
These strategies debilitated many social networks and community organizations. Non-
state armed actors instilled fear among the population, and deliberately targeted community 
leaders and some organizations to force collaboration. Paramilitary groups targeted 
productive and social organizations because they perceived them to be lenient to guerrilla 
groups. Willingness to participate in community organizations or collective activities 
decreased in many communities. Fear and the risk of aggressions if being perceived as 
collaborators of opponent groups generated mistrust among the population. Many households 
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retreated to private life and restricted social interactions to family and some close friends. 
The destruction of infrastructure, land mines and compulsory confinement created further 
physical obstacles to collective activities (Grupo de Memoria Histórica 2011a, 2010).  
Armed groups also captured local organizations and created new ones, imposing 
leaders and new members. In some areas, community organizations became a protection 
mechanism against violence. In others, armed groups faced civil resistance in communities 
with strong organizations. In these places, armed groups busted into communities by coercing 
the actions of the JACs (Juntas the Acción Comunal), which are Community Action Boards 
formed in 1958 for the purpose of counteracting weak state presence in geographically 
isolated areas and strengthening social networks. Armed groups forced the population to 
attend JAC sessions and coerced its members to participate in public work. Community 
members attended meetings and participated in organizations out of fear. In other 
communities, non-state armed groups captured local organizations, and used them as a 
vehicle to further their political aims. Armed groups more easily influenced the population in 
communities with weak social organizations (Grupo de Memoria Histórica 2010).  
At the same time, some communities devised creative strategies to avoid total control 
by non-state armed actors over their organizations and collective life. Communities created 
new organizations with an apparent non-political purpose, such as sports, religious and 
cultural organizations, to avoid targeting. Massive protests relying on religious signs were 
organized after the occurrence of overt human rights violations. Direct negotiations between 
armed groups and community representatives took place to ease rules of conduct, request 
mercy for threatened community members, and prevent asset seizure. Women started to play 
a predominant role in community organizations to reduce the visibility of men or after their 
death (Grupo de Memoria Historica 2011b, 2013). We explore in subsequent sections these 
complex interactions between armed groups and local institutions in conflict-affected areas. 
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Theorizing the links between armed groups and local institutions 
 
The Colombia example illustrates how armed non-state actors may opt for different strategies 
when attempting to control local populations, from victimizing, displacing and looting, to 
capturing or creating new institutions for the provision of public goods and security, the 
organization (and control) of local markets and political structures and the enforcement of 
social norms. Local populations, on their part, exercise some degree of agency despite the 
hardship of living under (the threat of) violence. Some endure the presence of armed non-
state actors by obeying their rules, others resist (either peacefully or by forming armed 
defense groups) and others voluntarily participate and support different armed groups.  
Recent literature has shown that while some armed non-state groups act in violent and 
predatory ways towards local populations, others – particularly in the case of insurgencies – 
concentrate in gaining the support of civilians through the ways in which they organize local 
institutions, provide goods, services and security and impose social norms and behavior 
(Arjona 2010; Mampilly 2011; Weinstein 2007). Local populations may in turn resort to 
armed groups for physical and economic protection, especially when the state is weak, 
inadequate or abusive (Goodwin 2001; Justino 2009; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007), or may 
resist (actively or in hidden ways) the influence and presence of armed groups in their 
communities (Petersen 2001; Wood 2003). The effect of these complex interactions on local 
institutional change has remained weakly understood at both theoretical and empirical levels. 
Three theoretical mechanisms may underlie such effect as illustrated by the case of 
Colombia. The first is the establishment of (voluntary or coercive) alliances: armed conflicts 
may lead to new political and social alliances between armed groups and civilian populations 
(Kalyvas 2006; Wood 2003, 2008) when armed groups attempt to muster local support by 
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coercive means or otherwise, and populations try to survive (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). 
These could reflect patterns of (overt or covert) social and political mobilization prior to the 
conflict, or new alliances and networks shaped by the conflict itself (Wood 2008), not 
dissimilar by those observed in contexts where political actors offer patronage advantages in 
exchange for votes (Scott 1969; Stokes 2005). When confronted with the presence of armed 
groups, civilians adopt several strategies to minimize the risk of victimization and take 
advantage of economic opportunities: either forming alliances with political and military 
power holders, or avoiding political involvement to keep a low profile and restricting 
networks to the close family (Kalyvas 2006; Korf 2004). Some individuals may join in forms 
of collective action to either collaborate with or resist armed groups (or other behaviors in 
between). Others may remove themselves from local organizations for fear of being targeted 
(or are removed forcibly). These processes of alliance formation will lead to changes in local 
institutions as behaviors, decisions and norms change in response to (violent or non-violent) 
incentives. Alliance formation is therefore the result of negotiations and interactions between 
armed groups and civilians as armed groups attempt to establish themselves in particular 
communities, and local populations try to survive amidst the conflict.  
Armed groups may also attempt control local populations and territory through the 
outright capture of existing institutions or the establishment of new ones. Evidence for Italy 
and Germany reveals how the Fascist and Nazi parties captured pre-existing civic 
organizations to spread their message, recruit members, co-opt leaders, and take advantage of 
successful organization techniques (Satyanath et al. 2013; Riley 2005). Wood (2008) 
discusses how the Sendero Luminoso in Perú forced people to attend meetings and killed 
publicly community leaders in order to impose control and fear. Similar accounts are 
described in Tambiah (1986) for the case of the LTTE in Sri Lanka and in Kaplan (2010) for 
the case of Colombia.  
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Institutional change may also result from civilians resisting the presence and control of 
armed groups. People in areas of conflict are not necessarily peons used in strategic warfare. 
All suffer greatly from the effects of violence, but many resist armed groups and shape the 
dynamics of conflict and violence on the ground (Kalyvas 2006; Petersen 2001). Wood 
(2003) reports how peasants in El Salvador resisted the state army (by sometimes joining the 
rebel movement). Petersen (2001) discusses similar evidence in the case of Lithuanian 
resistance against Soviet occupation in the 1940s. Other resistance movements have taken the 
form of militia groups or civil defense groups, such as the notorious Kamajor in Sierra Leone 
or paramilitary groups in El Salvador, Perú and Colombia (Brockett 1990; Wood 2008). In 
Colombia, several accounts show that communities took control over their own security by 
creating self-defense and neighborhood watching groups (Kaplan 2010). Arjona (2010) 
shows that communities in Colombia with a history of stronger institutions were more likely 
to resist armed groups. As a response to resistance, armed groups may in turn inhibit the 
functioning of local organizations to prevent civil resistance movements or alienate support to 
the opponent group (Azam and Hoefler 2002; Engel and Ibáñez 2007). We explore how 
processes of alliance formation, control and capture by armed groups and resistance by 
civilians have shaped the relationship between armed group presence and local institutions in 
Colombia in the next sections. 
 
Data and empirical strategy  
 
We use several sources of data to investigate the causal impact of armed group presence on 
local institutions in Colombia. Our main dataset is the Encuesta Longitudinal Colombiana de 
la Universidad de los Andes (ELCA). The sample of this household survey covers 10,800 
households: 6,000 in urban areas and 4,800 in rural areas. In this paper, we use the rural 
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sample (surveyed in 2010) since the conflict in Colombia has mostly taken place in the rural 
areas. The rural sample is representative of small agricultural producers in four micro-
regions: Atlantic, Central, Coffee-Growing and South. Within each region, municipalities and 
communities were randomly chosen. The sample covers 17 municipalities and 222 rural 
communities (covering between 500 and 1,000 inhabitants). The household questionnaire 
collects detailed information on individual participation in social organizations, among a 
wealth of other socio-economic variables. The exact geographical location of each household 
was recorded using GPS. The rural community questionnaire elicited information on social 
and public infrastructure, economic conditions and the conflict history of the community 
during the 10 years prior to the survey.  
We complement the information in ELCA with several other sources of data. We 
gathered detailed information on geographical variables for the 222 ELCA communities 
based on sources from the official geographical institute in Colombia (IGAC) and the Global 
Land Cover Facility at the University of Maryland. We use additional municipal 
characteristics as controls in the different regressions based on data from a municipal panel 
collected by the Department of Economics of Universidad de los Andes, which regularly 
compiles information from several official sources. The data on violence and on armed group 
presence is partly generated from the ELCA community surveys and partly from official 
government sources on armed group presence and fronts that were present in each rural 
community in Colombia between 2000 and 2009. We combine the two sources because we 
have identified under-reporting in both datasets. In the community questionnaire, we found 
that some leaders may be afraid of answering truthfully if armed groups are present and/or 
exerting control, while other may not report armed group presence to avoid future attacks. 
Government sources seem also to under-report armed group presence. In rural communities 
where state presence is weak, government sources may not be aware of armed group 
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presence. Government sources may also not report presence of armed groups for strategic 
reasons. Reports of armed group presence are slightly higher in the official government data 
than in the ELCA community questionnaire: 25.1 and 23.6 percent, respectively.6 
Information for a large percentage of rural communities overlaps, but reports do not coincide 
in nearly 31.7 percent of all cases, justifying the combined use of the two data sources. 
 
Empirical strategy 
 
Our main empirical strategy relies on the construction of pairs of contiguous rural 
communities with and without presence of non-state armed actors. We define contiguous 
pairs of rural communities based on two criteria: (i) the two communities share a 
geographical border within the municipality; and (ii) among the two communities, one has 
presence of armed groups and the other does not. Any given rural community with presence 
of armed groups may have multiple pairs of rural communities without armed group 
presence. We exploit variation within each rural community pair to identify the impact of 
armed group presence on individual participation in collective organizations. Rural 
communities share a common history of institutional development, cultural traits, and social 
norms of collective participation, among others, that may influence participation in 
organizations and presence of non-state armed actors. By exploiting variation in the presence 
of armed actors within contiguous communities, we control for unobservable variables that 
vary smoothly across communities and are potential sources of bias. Acemoglu et al (2012), 
Naidu (2012), Gilligan et al (2014) and Dube et al (2010) use a similar spatial discontinuity 
strategy. 
                                               
6 These results are shown in Table A1 in the Supporting Information files. 
15 
 
The ELCA data shows that people living in rural communities with and without armed 
group presence have similar characteristics. Individuals living in rural communities with 
armed group presence are slightly less educated, poorer, and have younger household heads 
that are more likely to live in town of birth. The magnitude of these differences is, however, 
very small and all other characteristics are similar across all communities.7 There are 
statistically significant and large geographical differences across rural communities with and 
without armed group presence. Rural communities with armed group presence are much less 
populated, are located in drier areas, are less isolated and have significant fewer state 
institutions (table A2b).8  
The wide divergence we observe in geographical characteristics, but much less in terms 
of household characteristics, supports the use of our identification strategy. In addition, we 
examined the balance of household characteristics for communities with and without 
presence after creating the contiguous pairs. Matching communities in contiguous pairs 
reduces the differences across household characteristics.9 The differences for several 
geographic characteristics decrease as well, in particular the number of institutions and 
population, which may be correlated to participation. Other geographic characteristics are not 
necessarily correlated to participation, but are controlled for in any case in the main 
regressions. Specifically, we control for the set of geographic, household, land plot, rural 
community and municipality variables listed in tables A2a-b that potentially may 
simultaneously determine the presence of non-state armed actors, the incidence of violent 
shocks and individual participation in local organizations.   
 
Empirical model 
                                               
7 Detailed data is provided in Tables A2a and A2b in the Supporting Information files. 
8 The number of state institutions at the rural community level include day care enters, primary schools, 
secondary schools, and health centres. 
9 Evidence is shown in Table A3 in the Supporting Information files. 
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We estimate the following model for person i, in household h, located in rural community j, 
pair p and state k, 
 
𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑘 = 𝛼0 + 𝛾𝑝 + 𝑾′ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑘𝛼1 + 𝑿′ℎ𝑗𝑘𝛼2 + 𝒁′𝑗𝑘𝛼3 + 𝛼4𝑆𝑗𝑘 + 𝛼5𝐴𝑗𝑘 + 𝜈ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑘        (1) 
 
where 𝛾𝑝 denotes a rural community pair fixed effect. 𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑘 is our dependent variable 
of interest, representing individual participation in different types of organizations. 
Community organizations are divided into productive (cooperatives, unions and producers’ 
organizations), political (mostly JACs, but also political parties or movements and 
organizations supported by the state) and non-political (charity, environmental, cultural, sport 
or security organizations). Thanks to an extensive module on local collective action in ELCA, 
we are also able to distinguish between different dimensions of participation, including 
leadership, meeting attendance and engagement in decision-making. This is important 
because it allows us to assess not only whether individuals join collective organizations, but 
also how effectively they engage in them and participate in decision-making processes. For 
instance, it is possible that armed conflict is associated with increased meeting attendance of 
community members (e.g. Bellows and Miguel 2009) when armed groups use meetings for 
indoctrination purposes or to spread fear, as discussed in previous sections. This apparent 
increase in individual participation in social organizations may, however, be accompanied by 
reductions in the appointment of certain individuals to leadership positions or their 
engagement in decision-making processes. Our data allow us to disentangle these important 
mechanisms that underlie the structure of local collective organizations.  
Almost one quarter of people in our sample participate in local collective organizations. 
Ten percent take up leadership roles, 22.8% attend meetings and 15.5% engage in decision-
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making processes.10 Interestingly, overall participation, leadership, meeting attendance and 
engagement in decision-making are significantly higher in communities with presence of 
non-state armed actors, and mostly driven by participation in political organizations.11 In 
communities with armed group presence, 18.4% of individuals participate in political 
organizations, 7% are leaders in political organizations and 16.9% attend political meetings. 
The percentages for communities with no armed group presence are, respectively, 14.7%, 6% 
and 13.2%. The differences are statistically significant at conventional levels. However, only 
0.07% of individuals in communities with armed group presence participate in decision-
making processes within political organizations (versus 0.25% in communities with no armed 
group presence).   
 𝐴𝑗𝑘 is our main independent variable. It represents the years of presence of non-state 
armed actors during the 10 years prior to the survey in rural community j located in state k.  
𝑆𝑗𝑘 is the number of conflict-induced violent shocks that occurred in the rural 
community during the previous year. We control for violent shocks because, as discussed in 
Kalyvas (2006), violence typically intensify when two groups contest the same territory, but 
is likely to decline when one armed group takes control over a territory and its population. 
We define violent shocks as those clearly related to conflict such as homicides, illegal land 
seizure, kidnapping and threats from armed groups. We exclude cattle theft because it is 
difficult to establish whether it was performed by criminal or non-state armed groups. 
However, we control for cattle theft in all regressions. Sixteen percent of households suffered 
a covariate conflict-induced shock,12 during the year prior to the survey.13 The most frequent 
shock is homicides (12%). Threats from armed groups – which are not violent attacks but 
                                               
10 Detailed descriptive data is presented in Table A4 in the Supporting Information files. 
11 We define a dummy variable equal to one if during the period between 2000 and 2009 an armed group was 
present at least one year, according to any of the two sources of information discussed above.  
12 To measure household exposure to violent shocks, we have included a dummy variable equal to one if the 
household lives in a rural community that faced covariate violent shocks during the year before the survey. 
13 Evidence is provided in Table A5 in the Supporting Information files. 
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instill fear in the population – affect 4.1 percent of all households.14 Violent shocks are in 
general more frequent in communities with presence of armed groups but this effect is 
dominated by threats from armed groups, and not physical violence per se. In line with the 
predictions in Kalyvas (2006), if armed groups are present in a given community, homicides 
against the population are usually lower (albeit not statistically significant) than in 
communities with no armed group presence. Yet they use strategies, such as threats and 
kidnappings, to control the population.  
 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑘, 𝑋ℎ𝑗𝑘 and 𝑍𝑗𝑘  are vectors of individual, household and rural community controls, 
respectively, as discussed above. 𝜈ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑘 is a random error. All standard errors are clustered at 
the municipality level.  
 
The causal effect of armed group presence on local collective organizations  
 
Our main econometric results are presented in table 1. The regressions show that the longer 
the presence of armed groups in any given community, the larger the increase in overall 
participation, and across all dimensions. This impact is particularly strong for political 
organizations and the magnitude of the effects is large. Participation in political organizations 
increases by 5.6%, which is equivalent to 35% of total participation. Meeting attendance 
increases by 5% (34% of total). The impact of years of presence on productive organizations 
is also positive and significant for all dimensions of participation. 
 These are striking results that strongly suggest a positive and large association 
between armed group presence in Colombian communities and the strengthening of local 
collective institutions. It is, however, interesting to note that, alongside an increase in meeting 
                                               
14 The incidence of idiosyncratic shocks is also high: 9.8 percent of households have been individually exposed 
to violence. However, idiosyncratic violent shocks are related mostly to (cattle) theft, a shock not related to the 
conflict but rather to other criminal networks (and high in Colombia). The paper focuses therefore only on 
covariate violent shocks. 
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attendance, armed group presence is associated with a reduction in individual participation in 
decision-making within political organizations by 0.3% (which corresponds to 158% of the 
total), indicating that different mechanisms could be at play. We explore these results further. 
First, we conduct robustness tests to confirm their validity. We then proceed to test the 
theoretical mechanisms that may explain them. 
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Table 1. Participation in local organizations and years of presence of armed groups - 
Contiguous-pair fixed effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A Participation   Leader 
  Any Productive Political Other   Any Productive Political Other 
Years of 
presence 
of armed 
group 0.056*** 0.020*** 0.056*** 0.016*   0.013 0.005*** 0.012 -0.015*** 
  [0.009] [0.003] [0.004] [0.009]   [0.008] [0.001] [0.008] [0.004] 
Violent 
shocks -0.251*** -0.098*** -0.152*** -0.257***   0.079* -0.008 0.168*** -0.031* 
  [0.057] [0.016] [0.040] [0.037]   [0.040] [0.007] [0.033] [0.018] 
Obs. 7,455 7,455 7,455 7,455   7,455 7,455 7,455 7,455 
R-sq 0.158 0.069 0.181 0.081   0.091 0.048 0.084 0.063 
Panel B Meeting Attendance   Decision-Making 
  Any Productive Political Other   Any Productive Political Other 
Years of 
presence 
of armed 
group 0.053*** 0.019*** 0.050*** 0.006   0.022** 0.013*** -0.003** 0.003*** 
  [0.009] [0.002] [0.006] [0.008]   [0.008] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] 
Violent 
shocks -0.173*** -0.099*** -0.084** -0.161***   -0.177*** -0.085*** 0.000 -0.049*** 
  [0.054] [0.012] [0.038] [0.037]   [0.042] [0.011] [0.005] [0.005] 
Obs. 7,455 7,455 7,455 7,455   7,455 7,455 7,455 7,455 
R-sq 0.152 0.065 0.178 0.079   0.118 0.054 0.027 0.041 
Estimations include all geographic, household and individual controls presented in tables A2a and A2b. Standard errors (in brackets) 
are estimated clustering at the municipality level. 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05,* p<0.1 
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Validity of results 
 
The validity of the causal results discussed above is dependent on our ability to identify the 
presence of armed groups as a ‘treatment’ effect. The main challenge to this identification 
strategy is the occurrence of spillover effects across the boundaries of the rural communities. 
These spillover effects may arise because the presence of non-state armed actors may have an 
impact beyond the borders of the rural community, or because households may migrate to 
neighboring communities to avoid the impacts of conflict. If this is the case, we would expect 
individual participation in collective organizations to also increase in neighboring 
communities indicating that our results may underestimate the true effect of armed group 
presence on local collective organizations. This will not threaten our estimations in a 
substantial way given that we have obtained coefficients that are large in magnitude and 
statistically significant. However, our empirical strategy may not be appropriate if results are 
shown to be overestimated. This may be the case if fear or other reasons related to the 
presence of armed groups reduced participation in neighboring communities.  
In order to test for potential spillover effects, we conducted a placebo test. For each 
rural community without presence of non-state armed actors, we assigned the average 
number of years of presence of the bordering communities with presence of armed groups. 
We estimated then the regressions using only the sample of the communities without armed 
group presence. A statistically significant coefficient for years of presence would be 
indicative of spillover effects. A statistically significant and positive coefficient would 
indicate that the control communities (without armed group presence) are communities that 
may be strongly resisting armed groups. In that case, armed groups do not choose to go into 
those communities because they would rather avoid resistance and may rather choose 
communities that are easier to control. If this is the case, our results in the previous section 
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underestimate the true relationship between armed group presence and participation in 
collective action. In contrast, a statistically significant but negative coefficient would indicate 
an overestimation of the results. We find that the coefficients are not statistically significant 
and their magnitude is very small (tables 2 and 3). These results strongly suggest that 
spillover effects are unlikely to affect our results.15  
 
Mechanisms underlying the impact of armed groups on local institutions in Colombia 
 
It is not easy to analyze the mechanisms that may explain stronger individual participation in 
local collective organizations in regions with armed group presence. The discussion in 
previous sections suggested that competing mechanisms may be at play. On the one hand, we 
may argue that local populations make use of existing collective organizations to better 
establish alliances with armed groups, or organize themselves to counteract their presence. A 
less rosy outlook would interpret higher participation in local organizations as a result of the 
control exercised by armed groups upon local institutions. We test these hypotheses below.  
Alliance formation is not easy to observe empirically because people may try to hide 
their social interactions and networks in areas where insecurity is high. One solution would 
be to look at patterns of voting behavior in communities with armed group presence 
(Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos 2010). Unfortunately, the ELCA 2010 survey does not 
include this information. Another solution would be to examine patterns of unequal 
membership of different local collective organizations. This is because the formation of 
strategic alliances in conflict-affected areas is likely to create certain clubs that may include 
                                               
15  As an alternative robustness check we estimated propensity scores for the probability of armed groups’ 
presence in a community and created fictitious regions matching each community with presence of non-state 
armed actors to five rural communities without presence and the closest propensity score to the former. We 
performed the same estimations as in table 1 within these fictitious regions. The results are qualitatively similar 
to those of table 1. Most of the coefficient estimates for years of presence have the same sign but some are not 
statistically significant. This is to be expected because matching via PSM is likely to be less efficient than our 
matching strategy (Hirano, Imbens et al. 2003). Results are available from the authors upon request.  
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some community members (or other individuals brought into the community) that will 
advance the objectives of the armed group, and exclude those that oppose those objectives 
(see, for instance, Korf 2004). We are able to test for these potential distributional effects of 
organizational membership by looking at patterns of individual wealth and education status 
across individuals that participate in local collective organizations. The underlying hypothesis 
is the following: if our results reflect a genuine increase in the strength of civil society then 
we would not expect much of a difference across socio-economic groups because there would 
be no barriers to entry. The communities in our sample are all poor rural communities where 
socio-economic differences are almost negligent (as reported in table A2a). Significant 
differences across socio-economic groups would indicate some preference for who leads, 
particularly if the interests of that group are aligned to those of the armed group. 
Tables 2 and 3 show the results across education levels and wealth terciles. We divided 
households into educated (at least one household member with more than primary education) 
and less educated (no household members with more than primary education). We also 
divided households into low wealth (first tercile), medium wealth (second tercile) and high 
wealth (third tercile). The results are very striking, showing that increases in individual 
participation in political organizations are driven mostly by the wealthier and better educated. 
The results show, in addition, an increase in leadership in political organizations by wealthier 
individuals, but no change in their engagement in decision-making processes. In contrast, 
poorer and less educated individuals increase their participation, meeting attendance, 
leadership and decision-making engagement in productive organizations. The fact that we see 
an increase in participation – in particular political participation across wealthier individuals 
– may indicate some alliance formation between armed groups and more powerful 
individuals, similarly to the Sri Lanka case documented by Korf (2004). These findings are 
only indicative but suggest that alliance formation may potentially explain the positive effect 
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of armed group presence on individual participation in local collective organizations in 
Colombia.   
Testing competing hypotheses about the capture of local institutions by armed groups 
or resistance by communities is even more challenging because it is very difficult to obtain 
reliable data on these types of strategic objectives. We have been able, however, to gather 
two pieces of evidence that substantiate the ‘capture’ hypothesis. As discussed previously in 
the paper, increases in participation may indicate the capture of local institutions by armed 
groups if certain groups (such a community natives) stop being appointed as leaders or 
engaging in decision-making processes. These may be chased out of the community, killed or 
simply replaced by allies of the armed group as discussed in Wood (2008), who reports 
several instances of institutional capture by armed groups across recent civil wars. In order to 
partially test this hypothesis, we were able to construct a measure of ‘native inhabitant’ of the 
community by looking at whether the individual has always lived in the same house since the 
formation of the household. The results, presented in tables 2 and 3, show that the increase in 
participation in political organizations in communities with strong armed group presence are 
not being driven by individuals that have always lived in the community. In fact, these 
individuals reduce their participation (not statistically significant), leadership positions and 
meeting attendance in political organizations. Native inhabitants of the community do, 
however, increase their participation, leadership and decision-making in productive 
organizations. These results are remarkably similar to those obtained for the poorer 
individuals in the sample suggesting that perhaps the increase in participation in political 
organizations we observe in the previous section may be being driven by wealthier 
individuals from outside communities (rather than by local processes of alliance formation).16 
Indeed, some anecdotic evidence reports that non-state armed actors in Colombia have 
                                               
16 In order to identify whether this is the case, we regress the probability of being non-native on household 
characteristics. The results show non-natives are wealthier than natives. 
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strategically displaced some groups of the population in order to bring non-natives supportive 
of their ideology to communities they attempt to control.17 Armed actors provided also these 
non-natives with land and other productive assets.18  
 
  
                                               
17 http://moe.org.co/home/doc/moe_mre/CD/PDF/arauca.pdf retrieved on the 5th of July. 
18 For some examples see: 
http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/documentos/informes/informes2013/guerrilla-poblacion-civil.pdf  
and http://www.verdadabierta.com/tierras/despojo-de-tierras/5015-el-fantasma-de-sor-teresa-gomez-en-
territorio-chocoano retrieved on the 5th of July. 
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Table 2. Participation and assuming leadership positions: robustness checks and 
heterogeneous impact 
 
  Participation 
  
Leader 
  
  Any Prod. Political Other   Any Prod. Political Other 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A                   
Baseline  0.056*** 0.020*** 0.056*** 0.016*   0.013 0.005*** 0.012 -0.015*** 
  [0.009] [0.003] [0.004] [0.009]   [0.008] [0.001] [0.008] [0.004] 
Placebo -0.009 0.000 -0.007 -0.000   0.004 0.000 0.001 0.005 
  [0.008] [0.002] [0.010] [0.007]   [0.006] [0.001] [0.006] [0.004] 
Educated  0.010 -0.005 0.010 0.006   -0.038*** -0.008*** 0.005 -0.038** 
  [0.020] [0.007] [0.016] [0.023]   [0.012] [0.002] [0.011] [0.017] 
Not Educated  0.001 0.017*** -0.002 0.024**   -0.028*** 0.005*** -0.001 -0.028*** 
  [0.023] [0.002] [0.017] [0.011]   [0.009] [0.001] [0.008] [0.004] 
High income  0.036* -0.002*** 0.053*** 0.010   0.018** -0.002*** 0.028*** 0.001 
  [0.019] [0.001] [0.015] [0.010]   [0.008] [0.000] [0.008] [0.007] 
Medium 
income  -0.077*** -0.028*** -0.040*** -0.054***   -0.028** -0.006 0.020* -0.046*** 
  [0.016] [0.005] [0.012] [0.015]   [0.012] [0.003] [0.009] [0.010] 
Low income -0.055*** 0.044*** -0.032** -0.001   -0.033** 0.005 -0.013 -0.048*** 
  [0.017] [0.008] [0.015] [0.011]   [0.015] [0.003] [0.010] [0.011] 
Native -0.013 0.016*** -0.012 0.040**   -0.068*** -0.005** -0.056*** 0.000 
  [0.018] [0.004] [0.017] [0.015]   [0.011] [0.002] [0.011] [0.012] 
Panel B                   
Years of 
Presence of 
any armed 
group 0.040*** 0.014*** 0.041*** 0.014***   -0.001 0.004*** 0.008 -0.019*** 
  [0.006] [0.002] [0.005] [0.004]   [0.005] [0.001] [0.006] [0.002] 
Recent Arrival 
Armed 
Groups  -1.397** -0.222*** -1.242*** -0.105   -1.239*** -0.097*** -0.662*** -0.267 
  [0.491] [0.074] [0.185] [0.379]   [0.214] [0.031] [0.185] [0.165] 
Recent Arrival 
x Years of 
presence 0.818* 0.288*** 0.711*** 0.102   0.688*** 0.090*** 0.210 0.169 
Observations 7,455 7,455 7,455 7,455   7,455 7,455 7,455 7,455 
R-squared 0.158 0.069 0.181 0.081   0.091 0.048 0.084 0.063 
Each entry in panel A presents the coefficient estimate for the years of presence of armed groups in a regression using as dependent 
variable the outcome indicated in each column and restricting the sample as indicated in each row. Each column in panel B presents the 
estimation results for the corresponding outcome variable using the whole sample. All estimations include the geographic, household 
and individual controls presented in tables A2a and A2b. Standard errors (in brackets) are estimated clustering at the municipality level. 
*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1 
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Table 3. Meeting attendance and participation in decision-making: robustness checks 
and heterogeneous impact 
 
  Meeting Attendance 
  
Decision-Making 
  
  Any Prod. Political Other   Any Prod. Political Other 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A                   
Baseline  0.053*** 0.019*** 0.050*** 0.006   0.022** 0.013*** -0.003** 0.003*** 
  [0.009] [0.002] [0.006] [0.008]   [0.008] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] 
Placebo -0.009 0.000 -0.007 0.000   0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 
  [0.008] [0.002] [0.011] [0.007]   [0.008] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Educated  0.014 -0.008 0.009 0.006   -0.026** -0.008 -0.000 -0.002 
  [0.017] [0.008] [0.016] [0.026]   [0.009] [0.006] [0.003] [0.004] 
Not Educated  -0.010 0.016*** -0.011 0.010   -0.017 0.019*** -0.001 0.009*** 
  [0.022] [0.002] [0.016] [0.010]   [0.017] [0.001] [0.004] [0.000] 
High income  0.040** -0.002*** 0.056*** 0.011   0.019 -0.003*** 0.002 0.001 
  [0.018] [0.001] [0.015] [0.009]   [0.012] [0.000] [0.003] [0.003] 
Medium 
income  -0.071*** -0.024*** -0.031** -0.052***   -0.039** -0.008** -0.004** -0.008*** 
  [0.015] [0.005] [0.012] [0.015]   [0.017] [0.004] [0.002] [0.001] 
Low income -0.051*** 0.042*** -0.031** 0.001   0.011 0.021*** -0.001 -0.004* 
  [0.016] [0.006] [0.015] [0.011]   [0.017] [0.006] [0.003] [0.002] 
Native -0.044** 0.009* -0.034** 0.008   -0.037** 0.015*** -0.000 -0.007** 
  [0.020] [0.004] [0.016] [0.017]   [0.014] [0.002] [0.008] [0.003] 
Panel B                   
Years of 
Presence of 
any armed 
group 0.037*** 0.014*** 0.037*** 0.005   0.011 0.011*** -0.003*** 0.003*** 
  [0.006] [0.001] [0.006] [0.004]   [0.006] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Recent Arrival 
Armed Groups  -1.454*** -0.199*** -1.242*** -0.076   -1.000*** -0.066 0.049 0.025** 
  [0.449] [0.066] [0.174] [0.337]   [0.293] [0.054] [0.076] [0.011] 
Recent Arrival 
x Years of 
presence 0.788* 0.263*** 0.651*** 0.037   0.559* 0.124*** -0.026 0.007 
Observations 7,455 7,455 7,455 7,455   7,455 7,455 7,455 7,455 
R-squared 0.152 0.065 0.178 0.079   0.118 0.054 0.027 0.041 
Each entry in panel A presents the coefficient estimate for the years of presence of armed groups in a regression using as dependent 
variable the outcome indicated in each column and restricting the sample as indicated in each row. Each column in panel B presents 
the estimation results for the corresponding outcome variable using the whole sample. All estimations include the geographic, 
household and individual controls presented in tables A2a and A2b. Standard errors (in brackets) are estimated clustering at the 
municipality level. *** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1 
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We are able to add a second piece of evidence to these results by exploring further the 
differentiated effect of the length of armed group presence. In tables 2 and 3 (panel B), we 
explore whether the effect of years of presence of armed groups on participation is stronger in 
regions with a recent arrival of armed groups. The idea here is that we expect control of 
armed groups to increase across time. Therefore, if individual participation in collective 
organizations is driven by armed groups capturing local institutions then we expect this to 
increase as armed groups consolidate their presence in the community. Conversely, if 
participation is being driven by resistance, we would expect households to strongly adjust 
their behavior in regions with a recent arrival of armed groups and therefore increase 
participation in the short-term. Once they adjust beliefs about the behavior of armed groups 
and learn to live amid conflict, reactions towards armed group presence might be weaker and 
participation may reduce. In order to identify this potentially important effect, we create a 
dummy variable equal to one when armed groups have been present less than two years in a 
given community and interact this variable with armed group presence.19  
Panels B in tables 2 and 3 show the heterogeneous impact of armed group presence 
according to whether presence is recent (less than 2 years) or more prolonged (2 to 10 years). 
The results for the interaction term between years of armed presence and a dichotomous 
variable for recent presence indicates that households adjust sharply during the first two 
years. Recent presence of non-state armed actors reduces significantly participation in all 
dimensions, yet each additional year of presence increases participation. In other words, as 
the presence of armed groups prolongs, individuals increase participation in all dimensions. 
Although it is possible that this indicates that people become better at devising collective 
strategies to reduce the impact of armed groups and negotiate with them via collective 
organizations, we believe that these results, in conjunction with the evidence discussed 
                                               
19 We tested using one year or less of presence and the results are robust. The results are available upon request 
to the authors.  
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above, suggest that armed groups strengthen their control over the population over time, 
coercing communities members to participate more in organizations that advance their 
objectives. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The paper analyzed how armed conflict affects local institutions by examining the causal 
effect of armed group presence on individual participation in local forms of collective 
organization in Colombia. We made use of a unique dataset with specific modules designed 
to understand how institutions emerge and evolve during conflict. We derived causal effects 
of armed group presence on individual participation in local collective organizations by 
comparing contiguous pairs of rural communities that share common socio-economic 
characteristics but differ in terms of armed group presence.  
We found that non-state armed groups have a significant impact on the ability of 
communities to organize themselves collectively. The results showed that in communities 
where the armed groups stayed longer people participate more in local collective 
organizations. But larger individual participation does not necessarily translate into more 
democratic outcomes: although participation increases with armed group presence, the result 
is mostly driven by increases in the attendance of political meetings, while effective 
participation in decision-making processes is reduced. 
We explored whether increased participation is driven by communities organizing 
themselves to resist or counteract the influence of non-state armed actors or by non-state 
armed actors capturing organizations to impose a stronger control over the population. Our 
results support the latter mechanism. The results show that wealthier and better educated 
individuals participate more in local collective organizations (particularly in political 
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organizations) in communities with armed group presence. Evidence indicates further that 
locals are excluded from political organizations when armed groups impose leaders and other 
organization members that support their political cause. All results are stronger when armed 
groups stay longer in the community as this provides them time to consolidate their control. 
These results contribute significantly to better understanding of the links between 
armed conflict and institutional change. The absence of theorization and empirical evidence 
on channels linking variation in behavior of local populations, non-state armed groups and 
state actors with changing institutional environments has been one of the main gaps identified 
in the emerging research on local conflict dynamics (Blattman and Miguel 2010; Justino 
2013; Kalyvas 2008). This paper has shown how local institutions may be manipulated by 
armed groups to advance and cement their war strategies and political objectives. This is an 
important contribution to the literature because the impact of these processes of institutional 
transformation can be significant, affecting the ability of people to rely on and participate in 
community networks and organizations, as well as how countries will rebuild and resources 
will be accessed and distributed in the aftermath of armed conflict. In particular, the results 
point to some caution in current policy agendas on targeting aid to communities in the hope 
of strengthening local institutions and sustaining social cohesion. If the type of institutional 
capture we observe in Colombia is also present in other countries, post-conflict community-
level interventions may well reinforce war dynamics and the power of armed groups and their 
allies, thereby sowing the seeds for conflict re-ignition.  
The results have also important significance for the ongoing peace process in 
Colombia, where the role of local institutions will be central to the economic and social 
recovery of communities affected by several decades of violent conflict. It is very possible 
that after demobilization armed groups in Colombia may attempt to make use of the networks 
and institutions they have created and controlled over the last decades to gain political 
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leverage. However, as the evidence discussed in the paper shows, these institutions and 
networks may not necessarily represent the interests and needs of local populations. Real 
democratic outcomes will require serious investment by the Colombian national government 
to create strong and independent local institutions that will ensure the interests of all citizens 
– and not just those part of ongoing patronage networks – are represented in the political 
arena. This will not be an easy task.  
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Table A1. Armed group presence 
    Armed group presence (Government) 
% of rural communities 
(ELCA)   No Yes Total 
Armed group presence                         
(self-reported) 
No 59.8% 16.6% 76.4% 
Yes 15.1% 8.5% 23.6% 
Total 74.9% 25.1% 100.0% 
Source: Author's calculations based on ELCA (2010) and Government of Colombia (2010). 
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Table A2a. Descriptive statistics of main control variables  
Mean Whole 
Sample 
Covariate Shock + 
Armed Groups 
Presence   ++ 
(S.D.) No Yes No Yes 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5)   
Violent shocks (number of types) 1.00             
  (1.84)             
Years of presence 0.18             
  (0.44)             
 =1 if male headed 0.489 0.487 0.494   0.487 0.491   
  (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)   (0.50) (0.50)   
Age 44.43 44.43 44.45   44.67 44.02 ** 
  (13.46) (13.41) (13.72)   (13.74) (12.95)   
Years of completed education 4.41 4.41 4.40   4.46 3.48 * 
  (3.37) (3.37) (3.41)   (4.32) (3.18)   
 =1 if lives in town of birth 0.09 0.09 0.09   0.06 0.13 *** 
  (0.28) (0.28) (0.28)   (0.24) (0.34)   
Number of household members 4.61 4.58 4.74 *** 4.63 4.57   
  (1.94) (1.93) (1.99)    (1.97) (1.89)   
Children under 5 years 0.54 0.53 0.62 *** 0.53 0.55   
  (0.79) (0.77) (0.86)   (0.79) (0.77)   
Wealth Index -0.01 -0.04 0.15 ** 0.10 -0.19 *** 
  (2.51) (2.45) (2.77)   (2.68)  (2.17)   
Observations 7,455 6,239 1,216   4,708 2,747   
Source: Author's calculations based in ELCA (2010) and Government Data (2010) 
 + Difference between samples with and without covariate shocks.  ++ Difference between samples with and without 
presence of armed groups. Test for mean differences *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2b. Descriptive statistics of municipality and community control variables 
across shock exposure and armed group presence 
Mean Whole 
Sample 
Covariate Shock + 
Armed Groups 
Presence   ++ 
(S.D.) No Yes No Yes 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5)   
Number of households on community 107.34 109.70 95.25 *** 124.94 77.18 *** 
  (120.70) (127.56) (75.17)   (138.38) (72.65)   
Monthly rainfall average 1980-2008 
(mm) 
144.54 144.06 147.04 *** 145.83 142.33 *** 
  ( 31.45) (31.56) (30.74)   (29.44) (34.51)   
Months rainfall one S. D. below the 
mean 
1.41 1.35 1.75 *** 1.27 1.65 *** 
  (1.10) (1.07) (1.17)   (1.11) (1.02)   
Months rainfall one S. D. above the 
mean 
0.79 0.81 0.72 *** 0.76 0.84 ** 
  (0.90) (0.91) (0.90)   (0.95) (0.82)   
Time to reach urban center (hrs.) 0.78 0.77 0.84 *** 0.75 0.82 *** 
  (0.70) (0.69) 0.71   (0.72) (0.66)   
Number of institutions in rural 
community 
3.45 3.41 3.65 *** 3.78 2.89 *** 
  (2.23) (2.24) 2.18   (2.30) (1.98)   
Lack of water in rural community 0.48 0.48 0.46   0.44 0.54 *** 
  (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)   (0.50) (0.50)   
Municipal homicide rate (1993-2000)  60.40 61.93 52.53 *** 54.63 70.28 *** 
  (47.54) (49.32) (36.07)   (44.56) (50.76)   
Municipal homicide rate (2000-2008)  40.04 40.36 38.38 ** 36.36281 46.34 *** 
  (29.70) (30.68) (24.03)   (26.93) (33.00)   
Distance to capital of state (km) 64.52 65.49 59.52 *** 62.95 67.21 *** 
  (41.47) (40.34) (46.53)   (43.33) (37.91)    
Distance to primary road (km) 7.53 7.04 10.02 *** 5.99 10.16 *** 
  ( 8.67) (7.73) (12.12)   (6.84) (10.63)   
Distance to non-primary road (km) 3.46 3.50 3.22 ** 3.82 2.83 *** 
  (2.53) (2.62) (1.94)   (2.65) (2.15)   
Distance to rivers (km) 15.09 15.34 13.81 *** 16.09 13.36 *** 
  (12.70) (13.04) (10.67)   (13.63) (10.68)   
Distance to sea (km) 162.18 164.94 148.03 *** 157.43 170.33 *** 
  (113.91) (114.87) (107.84)   (122.95)  (95.98)   
Distance to river routes (km) 79.75 79.15 82.81 *** 83.13 73.94 *** 
  (23.24) (23.70) (20.41)   (18.48) (28.76)   
Soil erosion index 3.27 3.29 3.16 * 3.11 3.53 *** 
  (2.06) (2.04) (2.14)   (2.09) (1.97)   
Observations 7,455 6,239 1,216   4,708 2,747   
Source: Author's calculations based in ELCA (2010) and Government Data (2010) 
Distance variables calculated from communities' centroids.  Municipal homicide rates are averages of annual per 100,000 
inhabitants' rates.  + Difference between samples with and without covariate shocks.  ++ Difference between samples with 
and without presence of armed groups. Test for mean differences *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A3. Differences in sample means in communities with and without armed group 
presence 
  Without FE 
With Community 
FE 
  (1) (2) 
 =1 if male headed 0.005  0.000 
  (0.012) (0.025) 
Age -0.652** -1.274** 
  (0.323) (0.650) 
Years of completed education -0.144* -0.053 
  (0.081) (0.163) 
 =1 if lives in town of birth 0.070*** 0.068*** 
  (0.007) (0.013) 
Number of household members -0.061 0.120  
  (0.047) (0.093) 
Children under 5 0.020  0.0821** 
  (0.019) (0.038) 
Wealth Index -0.288*** -0.205* 
  (0.060) (0.116) 
Number of households on community -47.76*** -21.80*** 
  (2.845) (1.502) 
Monthly rainfall mean 1980-2008 (mm) -3.501*** 8.753*** 
  (0.754) (0.340) 
Months rainfall one S. D. below the mean 0.378*** 0.0740*** 
  (0.026) (0.016) 
Months rainfall one S. D. above the mean 0.0741*** 0.101*** 
  (0.022) (0.012) 
Time to reach urban center (hrs.) 0.0658*** 0.131*** 
  (0.017) (0.005) 
Number of institutions in rural community -0.883*** -0.0410** 
  (0.053) (0.018) 
Lack of water in rural community 0.101*** 0.128*** 
  (0.012) (0.004) 
Municipal homicide rate (1993-2000)  14.10*** 32.07*** 
  (1.064) (0.420) 
Municipal homicide rate (2000-2008)  8.449*** 18.33*** 
  (0.691) (0.289) 
Distance to capital of state (km) 4.265*** -4.238*** 
  (0.994) (0.407) 
Distance to primary road (km) 4.170*** 1.786*** 
  (0.203) (0.034) 
Distance to non-primary road (km) -0.997*** -0.465*** 
  (0.060) (0.019) 
Distance to rivers (km) -2.735*** 3.605*** 
  (0.303) (0.069) 
Distance to sea (km) 12.90*** -21.69*** 
  (2.731) (1.365) 
Distance to river routes (km) -9.186*** -5.087*** 
  (0.548) (0.163) 
Soil erosion index 0.420*** 0.329*** 
  (0.049) (0.038) 
Observations 7,455 7,455 
Source: Author's calculations based in ELCA (2010) and Government Data (2010) 
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Table A4. Participation outcomes across shock exposure and armed group presence 
  Whole 
Sample 
Covariate Shock    Armed Groups Presence   
  No  Yes    No  Yes    
  (1) (2) (3) + (4) (5) ++ 
Participation in organizations 24.45% 24.44% 24.51%   23.70% 25.74% ** 
Leadership 10.10% 10.00% 10.61%   9.77% 10.67%   
Meeting attendance 22.76% 22.68% 23.19%   21.96% 24.14% ** 
Decision-making 15.52% 15.36% 16.37%   15.36% 15.80%   
Participation in productive associations 1.26% 1.12% 1.97% ** 1.42% 0.98%   
Participation in political organizations 16.08% 16.20% 15.46%   14.74% 18.38% *** 
Participation in other organizations 10.03% 9.75% 11.51% * 10.49% 9.25% * 
Leader in productive associations 0.52% 0.46% 0.82%   0.47% 0.62%   
Leader in political organizations 6.37% 6.30% 6.74%   5.99% 7.03% * 
Leader in other organizations 4.23% 4.18% 4.44%   4.25% 4.19%   
Meeting attendance productive associations 1.17% 1.03% 1.89% ** 1.30% 0.95%   
Meeting attendance political organizations 14.55% 14.59% 14.39%   13.17% 16.93% *** 
Meeting attendance other organizations 9.58% 9.33% 10.86% * 10.00% 8.85%   
Decision-making productive associations 0.91% 0.83% 1.32%   0.98% 0.80%   
Decision-making  political organizations 0.19% 0.18% 0.25%   0.25% 0.07% * 
Decision-making  other organizations 0.35% 0.32% 0.49%   0.45% 0.18% * 
Observations 7,455 6,239 1,216   4,708 2,747   
Source: Author's calculations based in ELCA (2010) and Government Data (2010) 
 + Difference between samples with and without covariate shocks. ++ Difference between samples with and without presence of armed 
groups. Test for mean differences *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A5. Incidence of violent shocks – Whole sample and by armed group presence 
  
% of households 
Armed Groups Presence 
  Covariate Shocks No Yes 
 =1 at least one shock during last year 16.3% 15.0% 18.5% *** 
 =1 if shock: homicides 12.2% 12.7% 11.4%   
 =1 if shock: land eviction 1.0% 0.8% 1.2% * 
 =1 if shock: kidnapping 1.2% 0.8% 1.8% *** 
 =1 if shock: threats from armed groups 4.1% 2.3% 7.0% *** 
Observations 7,455 4,708 2,747   
Idiosyncratic Shocks % of households 
Armed Groups Presence 
  No Yes 
 =1 if at least one shock during last year 9.8% 9.3% 10.8% *** 
 =1 if assets/property destruction 1.2% 1.0% 1.6% ** 
 =1 if victims of violence 0.4% 0.4% 0.4%   
 =1 if property theft 7.0% 6.7% 7.5%   
 =1 if robberies 1.9% 1.7% 2.2% * 
 =1 if extortion 0.2% 0.1% 0.3% * 
Observations 7,455 4,708 2,747   
Source: Author's calculations based on ELCA (2010) 
Test for differences in sample means between communities with and without armed group presence *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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